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INTRODUCTION
As used today, the term “equity” connotes a variety of related, but
nonetheless distinct, ideas. In most contexts, equity refers to the body of
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rules and doctrines that emerged in parallel with the common law, and
which merged with the common law by the late nineteenth century.1 At a
purely conceptual level, some trace the term back to Aristotle’s notion of
epieikeia, or the process of infusing the law with sufficient flexibility to avoid
injustice.2 Lastly, at a largely practical level, a few treat equity as
synonymous with a set of remedies that courts can authorize, all of which
are characterized by being “extraordinary” and “discretionary” in form and
substance.3
While equity is often understood as either a repository of substantive
rules and doctrines, or, more generally, as a parallel court system that
developed in seventeenth and eighteenth century England with its own set
of procedural rules and uniquely discretionary remedies, this understanding
is incomplete in one important respect. Equity also represents a distinctive
approach to legal reasoning within a primarily statute-centric area of law,
involving an increased role for courts in the lawmaking process and a ready
recourse to a set of ethical principles that are presumed to be normatively
superior to the strict letter of the law.4 In the traditional common law this
use of equity came to be known as the process of “equitable interpretation”5
or as determining the “equity of the statute.”6 Used in this conception, it
authorized courts to extend or restrict the otherwise clear words of a statute
to give effect to the statute’s “ratio or purpose.”7
In this Article, we argue that equity, understood in this sense, is deeply
influential in the construction and operationalization of copyright doctrine.
1 See 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 489-91 (2d ed. 1832);
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 673-74 (5th ed.
1956); ROSCOE P OUND, READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW
118 (1904); Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53-59 (1993).
2 See Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of “Equity’” (Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 119, 121-26 (1942). See generally Darien Shanske, Revitalizing Aristotle’s Doctrine of
Equity, 4 LAW, C ULTURE & HUMAN. 352 (2008); Roger A. Shiner, Aristotle’s Theory of Equity, 27
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1256 (1994); Jesús Vega, Legal Rules and Epieikeia in Aristotle: Postpositivism Rediscovered, in ARISTOTLE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: THEORY, P RACTICE
AND JUSTICE 171, 180 (Liesbeth Huppos-Cluysenaer & Nuno M.M.S. Coelho eds., 2013) (23 IUS
GENTIUM: COMP. PERSP. ON L. & JUST.).
3 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV .
524, 534-35 (1982); see also Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable
Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 315-23 (2003); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of
Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978).
4 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001);
Raymond B. Marcin, Epieikeia; Equitable Lawmaking in the Construction of Statutes, 10 CONN. L.
REV. 377 (1978).
5 Manning, supra note 4, at 29.
6 Id. at 29-30; see also RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 275 (2012).
7 Manning, supra note 4, at 22.
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While copyright law is obviously statutory in origin, the influence of equity
on its working is best seen in relation to the role that the federal courts—
primarily the U.S. Supreme Court—have had on its shape and direction. In
a variety of doctrinal areas, the Supreme Court’s copyright jurisprudence
reveals a distinct pattern of curbing behavior that, while in strict compliance
with the letter of the law, is inconsistent with the values and purposes of the
copyright system. The Supreme Court’s efforts to align the text of the
statute’s directives with its perceived goals thus partakes of what the
common law characterized as the process of giving effect to the equity of the
statute. While premised on the notion of gap filling, the process was
routinely directed at curtailing opportunistic behavior on the part of
litigants who sought to take advantage of the statute’s literal terms, while
violating the unstated normative goals of the legislation. A careful
examination of Supreme Court decisions on core copyright issues over the
last few decades reveals the profound role that the equity of the statute has
had on the content of copyright doctrine. In addition, it sheds light on the
real and all too often overlooked role that courts play in the creation and
construction of both copyright doctrine and the copyright system’s
underlying goals and values.
To understand why copyright law has maintained such a close rapport
with this understanding of equity, it is necessary to understand the symbiotic
relationship between copyright law and technology. Very few legal areas are
as profoundly affected by technological change as is copyright law. This
reality of constant technological change, as well as the development of new
business models in the market for informational goods and services, has
required copyright law to update the applicability of its core goals and ideals
to new situations. The formal content of its statutory directives has
routinely proven to be outdated, and legislative reforms have often proven
to be an inadequate means of redress.8 In these myriad situations, the Court
has had to step in and use its interpretive powers to protect the normative
integrity of our copyright system. In engaging in this process, the Court has
effectively determined the equity of the copyright statute’s substantive
content, despite occasional allusions to Congressional intent.9 We term this
shaping of copyright’s core substantive rights by reference to an actual or
imputed purpose (or set of goals) for the institution, the process of
determining the “substantive equity of the statute.”
8 For a recent account by the Register of Copyright, see Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great
Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 319-20 (2013).
9 But see EKINS, supra note 6, at 275 (treating equitable interpretation as an act of discerning
legislative intent).
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Beginning with the Supreme Court’s famed decision in Harper & Row,
where the Court introduced a “good faith” requirement into the statutory
fair use analysis in order to hold the defendant liable,10 the Court has
expanded, constricted, and molded the directives of the copyright statute by
reference to the institution’s primary purposes. The same basic approach, we
argue, serves to explain the Court’s decisions in the areas of: originality,11
secondary liability,12 the first sale doctrine and its applicability to greymarket imports,13 and, most recently, in the public performance right.14 In
each of these instances the Court’s stated objective was to bring the
substantive content of copyright doctrine in line with its own conception of
copyright’s principal values and ideals, recognizing that the text of the law
allowed actors to ensure token compliance with the system, while subverting
its motivating goals and objectives. An unstated recourse to the “equity of
the statute” allowed the Court to shape copyright law to realign its content
with its purposes.
Somewhat interestingly, equity’s role as an unstated substantive gloss on
copyright doctrine is to be contrasted with equity’s express influence on the
adjectival content of the copyright statute. We see equity playing a more
overt role in shaping the copyright statute’s procedural and remedial
dimensions. In these areas, copyright law is conceived of by the Court as
having been built against a set of background principles relating to the
interaction between equity and the common law as parallel systems. The
Court’s copyright jurisprudence in these domains can be seen as balancing
this interaction and preserving the traditional virtues of equitable
decisionmaking—flexibility, discretion, and remedial equilibration—to allow
future courts to give effect to copyright’s goals and purposes on a situational
basis.15 This flexibility and discretion are in turn meant to be directed at
policing parties’ use of the copyright system to ensure that such use
conforms to the underlying purposes of the system. Here too, the Court’s
jurisprudence can be seen as an effort to determine the equity of the statute.
We characterize this approach as relating to the “adjectival equity of the statute.”

10 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); see infra
subsection II.A.1.
11 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see infra subsection
II.A.2.
12 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); see infra
subsection II.A.3.
13 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013); see infra subsection II.A.4.
14 See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); see infra subsection II.A.5.
15 See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The Relations Between Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L.
REV. 537, 542 (1913); Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20 (1905).
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The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence relating to the copyright statute’s
remedial and procedural rules offers a good illustration of this phenomenon.
In the areas of awarding a prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees,16
understanding the requirement of copyright registration as a prerequisite
for a civil action,17 and most recently relating to the availability of an
independent laches defense to infringement,18 we see the Court rejecting
doctrinal formulations aimed at minimizing judicial discretion. When
presented with two competing interpretations of the statute, both of which
further copyright’s purposes in some measure, the Court is seen to prefer
the one that would preserve its flexibility for the future: a flexibility that it
characterizes as necessary to realize an alignment between copyright’s
systemic goals and individual litigants’ motives.
Equity thus modulates copyright law as both a substantive and
adjectival gloss on doctrine. In the former, equity’s mechanism is subtle,
unstated, and often masked by a recourse to congressional intent; in the
latter, it is overt, express, and tied to equity’s emphasis on discretion and
flexibility. Beyond shedding light on the role of equity in copyright law, the
interplay between the two approaches also explains an important and often
ignored attribute of copyright law that relates directly to the central theme
of this Symposium: the perceived and actual role that courts play in
determining the content of copyright doctrine and the goals of the
copyright system.
An important caveat is in order here. In describing the Supreme Court’s
use of the statute’s equity to develop copyright law under the copyright
statute, we should not be understood as suggesting that the Court’s
substantive outcomes in the individual cases were “equitable” in the sense of
being fair and just, nor indeed that the rule developed by the Court in the
case was equitable in that sense. We do not make any such claim. Our
concern in this Article is with explaining the process of lawmaking adopted
by the Court in its copyright jurisprudence, and its efforts to fit and justify
the process and outcome as a matter of copyright law and policy.19 The
ambition of this Article is, therefore, purely explanatory, not normative.
The Article unfolds in three Parts. Part I provides a brief overview of
equity and the various ways in which the term has been used in legal
thinking. Part II then illustrates the working of equity in copyright law, and
differentiates between equity’s role as a substantive and adjectival gloss on
16
17
18
19

See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014).
See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058-60 (1975).
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copyright doctrine. The paper then concludes by relating equity’s role in
copyright law to the question of how doctrine is created, shaped, and
legitimized by courts in the copyright discourse.
I. THE “EQUITY” OF THE STATUTE
To Aristotle, equity represented the phenomenon of closing the gap
between justice and the formal or written law, or as he puts it “a correction
of law, where law falls short because of its universality.”20 Later he describes
the idea again as “that justice which lies beyond the written law.”21 In these
early uses of the term, “equity” represented an effort to discern the spirit or
ideal of a law, to ensure that the formal structural and institutional
limitations of the law do not impede its realization and produce injustice.
Today, “equity” means a variety of different things in contemporary legal
discourse. Yet, Aristotle’s conceptualization has remained influential in
shaping our understanding of equity and its use by courts. Consequently,
equity continues to be thought of as a mechanism for interpreting and
supplementing the formal law to ensure just and correct results.22
This gap-filling notion of equity predates the development of equity as a
separate basis for jurisdiction in the Courts of Chancery in sixteenthcentury England.23 To mitigate the perceived rigidities of the formal
common law, as developed and dispensed by the King’s Courts, a
mechanism developed in England for petitioning the Lord Chancellor for
relief on a discretionary basis, which came to be known as equity.24 While
this system originated in the ideal of discretion, it soon came to acquire a
formal rigidity akin to the common law, and thus emerged as a parallel
system. Only in the mid–nineteenth century did the two systems—equity
and the common law—come to be formally merged in England.25 In the
exercise of this jurisdiction, the Courts of Chancery, in turn, came to develop
and administer a variety of special remedies, which continued to be described
as “equitable” long after equity ceased to remain an independent jurisdiction.
20 Shiner, supra note 2, at 1247 (translating the quote from ARISTOTLE, ETHICA
NICOMACHEA bk. V, at 111 (I. Bywater ed., 1894) (c. 384 B.C.E.)).
21 Id. (translating the quote from ARISTOTLE , ARS RHETORICA bk. I, at 59 (W.D. Ross
ed., 1959) (c. 330 B.C.E.)).
22 See, e.g., William T. Quillen, Constitutional Equity and the Innovative Tradition, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 51 (1993) (describing the role of equity in the Delaware Chancery Court).
23 William H. Loyd, The Equity of a Statute, 58 U. PA. L. REV. 76, 76 (1909).
24 See 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194-263 (7th ed.
1956); George Burton Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87 (1916).
25 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 638 (3d ed. 1922)
(discussing the role of the Judicature Acts in effecting this merger).
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As a mechanism of gap-filling, equity assumed special significance
within the common law when it came to the interpretation, application, and
elaboration of statutes. This occurred through the doctrine of the “equity of
the statute” or “equitable interpretation.”26 The doctrine finds elaboration in
the leading accounts of equity and the common law.27 John Norton Pomeroy,
in his well-known treatise on equity thus notes that it
[T]akes place when the provisions of a statute, being perfectly clear, do not
in terms embrace a case which, in the opinion of the judge, would have been
embraced if the legislator had carried out his general design. The judge . . .
interprets the statute extensively, or according to its equity, and treats it is
as though it actually did include the particular case.28

Similarly, Sir Edward Coke defines it as the
[C]onstruction made by the Judges, that cases out of the letter of a statute
yet being within the same mischiefe, or cause of the making of the same,
shall bee within the same remedie that the Statute provideth; And the
reason hereof is for that the Law-maker could not possibly set downe all
cases in expresse termes . . . .29

The doctrine of the equity of the statute refers to the process by which a
court seeks to align the purpose or general design of the statute with its
doctrinal directives, even when the literal terms of those directives do not
suggest such an alignment.30 It entails imputing indeterminacy to the
textual content of the statute and then resolving that indeterminacy by
recourse to the normative goals and purposes of the statute or area in
question. In essence then, “equitable interpretation,” or the approach of
discerning the equity of a statute, shares several important characteristics
with the core tenets of Legal Realism: a belief in the insufficiency of formal
law (i.e., textual law) as a mechanism for deciding individual cases, the need
to resort to normative considerations of policy and purpose to understand
and apply the law, and the recognition that courts—namely, judges—do

26 See Frederick J. deSloovère, The Equity and Reason of a Statute, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 591
(1936); Loyd, supra note 23, at 76; Manning, supra note 4, at 22; Marcin, supra note 4, at 392-97.
27 See, e.g., 2 JOHN A USTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 596-97 (Robert Campbell
ed., 4th ed. 1873); 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 649 (3d ed.
1768); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91; 4 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 379 (1785).
28 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 44 (4th ed. 1918).
29 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1608), reprinted in 2 THE
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 573, 682 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
30 Manning, supra note 4, at 22-27.
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more than just declare the law in individual cases.31 It is therefore no simple
coincidence that some of the most vocal defenders of this doctrine in the
early twentieth century were major figures in the Legal Realist movement,
including Max Radin and James Landis.32
Determining the equity of a statute was thus unquestionably a process of
lawmaking, a reality the proponents of the doctrine readily acknowledged
and embraced.33 Those who favored its use preferred it as an interpretive
approach to textualism (which emphasized looking to the bare text of a
statute and its plain meaning) and intentionalism (which looked to
Congressional intent as the touchstone of interpretation).34
Indeed, the Legal Realist critique of legislative intent formed the
backdrop for the mid–twentieth century revival of the doctrine of the
equity of the statute.35 Its proponents routinely described it as integral to
the “collaborative” model of lawmaking, where courts were seen as engaged
in a continuous dialogue with Congress (or other legislative bodies) not just
about the application of the law but also about its normative and doctrinal
content.36 As a practical matter then, the process of determining the equity
of a statute consciously conflated the judicial roles under the common law
and under a statutory regime, relying extensively on the development of a
corpus of judge-made precedents to influence the future growth and
direction of the law in an inductive manner.
One may of course question whether this conception of equity bears any
real connection to equity as a body of discretionary rules and remedies at
all, or whether it is a mere attempt at a repurposing of the term for what is,
in effect, a process of “purposive” statutory interpretation. Despite
appearances to the contrary, there remains an important relationship
between the two. Insofar as equity developed as a body of rules and as a
method of lawmaking that served to supplement the rigidity of the common
31 For an account of the idea that courts do indeed make law in individual cases, see Karl N.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 452 (1930).
32 See, e.g., James McCauley Landis, Statutes and Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 213 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1934); Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV.
388 (1942); see also Marcin, supra note 4, at 398 (“[I]t was left to the American realists . . . to once
again release the gremlin of equitable lawmaking by judges . . . .”).
33 Manning, supra note 4, at 22-25.
34 Id. at 25.
35 For the Legal Realist’s critique of legislative intent, see JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 172-73 (Macmillan 1921); and Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930); see also United States v. Klinger, 199 F. 2d 645,
648 (2d Cir. 1952).
36 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479
(1987); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
541 (1988).
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law and to ensure that opportunistic behavior by litigants in individual cases
did not go unaddressed in the absence of more fine-grained tools,37 equity in
both its stand-alone and statutory conceptions can be seen as aimed at
accomplishing the same result or goal. Of course, the primary difference is
that, in one instance, the blunt instrument being corrected (or
supplemented) is itself judge-made, adding an element of institutional
legitimacy to the process. In the other, it is legislative, requiring an added
institutional account to justify heightened judicial involvement therein. To
be sure, scholars—principally of the textualist bent—have critiqued courts’
reliance on the doctrine of the equity of the statute on precisely these
grounds, namely, for violating the separation of powers ideal.38
For the purposes of this Article, we use the term “equity” primarily to
refer to the process of normative legal reasoning and statutory
interpretation, characterized by the doctrine of a statute’s equity. In the
copyright context, it represents situations in which courts develop a rule of
copyright law that intermeshes the textual directives of the statute with
their own understandings of copyright’s goals and objectives. While the
equity of the statute is our primary concern here, we also look to how that
process itself understands and elaborates certain traditional rules of
equity—now understood as a body of discretionary rules and remedies. In
other words, as we show in our discussion of the adjectival equity of the
statute, the superimposition of the equity of the statute over equitable rules
contained in the statute presents an interesting account of what equity
entails in this domain of copyright law.
II. THE EQUITY OF THE COPYRIGHT STATUTE
As a purely formal matter today, federal copyright law is governed by a
statute, the Copyright Act.39 Copyright is structured as a set of exclusive
rights that relate to an original work of expression.40 In the typical case, the
exclusive set of rights vests in the author, who may freely alienate or license
those exclusive rights to others, much like ordinary personal property.41 The
copyright owner’s exclusive rights revolve around the central idea of
37 For an account of equity that understands this function in terms of curbing opportunistic
behavior, see Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 6-38 (Oct. 22, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmith_
LawVersusEquity7.pdf.
38 For the leading account, see Manning, supra note 4, at 56-126.
39 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012).
40 Id. § 102.
41 Id. § 201.
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reproduction, without which an infringement typically does not occur.42
Generally, an unauthorized reproduction, distribution, performance, display,
or adaptation of the protected work amounts to an “infringement” that the
copyright owner has the option of enforcing through the statute’s private
law machinery.43
To establish an infringement, a copyright owner must generally prove
that she owns a valid copyright in the work in question, that the defendant
copied protected expression from the work, and that such copying was
“substantial” enough to be treated as actionable.44 Once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of infringement, the defendant can invoke any
of the statute’s applicable defenses to copyright infringement. While some
of these immunities are of general applicability—such as the fair use
doctrine45 and the doctrine of first sale46—others are subject-matter specific
or pertain to certain categories of protected works.47
Copyright law is complex and builds on a host of different concepts,
drawn from property, torts, unjust enrichment, and contract law. This
complex edifice of the institution is at its base meant to be in service of a
higher ideal, one that is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, where Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 empowers Congress to enact copyright legislation “[t]o
promote the progress of science and the useful arts.”48 Ever since its origins
in Anglo-American law, copyright has been understood as serving a
predominantly utilitarian goal, captured in the idea of the “encouragement
of learning” and the prevention of “detriment” and “ruin” to authors and
their families.49 Over the years, courts, scholars, and legislators have given
this utilitarian ideal more concrete expression through the notion of creator
incentives, under which copyright’s structure of exclusive rights is taken to
encourage authors to produce creative expression, which is in turn seen to
inure to the benefit of society more broadly.50 All the same, copyright’s
42 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, N IMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01[A]
(2011) (“[A]bsent copying, there can be no infringement of copyright . . . .”). For an elaboration,
see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of
Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1669 (2012).
43 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a)–(b).
44 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, §§ 13.01–.05.
45 17 U.S.C. § 107.
46 17 U.S.C. § 109. It is to be noted that the first sale defense applies only to the exclusive
right of distribution but not to other exclusive rights. Id.
47 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 110, 112, 117, 119, 121, 122.
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49 These phrases were used in the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne. Copyright Act,
1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.).
50 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. P OSNER, THE E CONOMIC S TRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003).
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bundle of exclusive rights operates as a limited monopoly, and in so doing
imposes costs on the public by restricting their ability to use and copy a
work, once produced and protected. Since copyright is, in the end, justified
by reference to its public (or social) benefit, its utilitarian ideal of
encouraging creativity comes to be qualified by the public’s need for
access.51 It is in the balance between the two that modern copyright law’s
primary purpose is taken to lie.
While the copyright act strives to be comprehensive in its coverage of
copyright’s core principles, its directives remain incomplete in capturing the
system’s analytical and normative complexity. Several of copyright’s most
important doctrines find no mention at all in the text of the statute,52 or
instead find passing mention at best.53 Moreover, all of the statutory
dictates are susceptible to a related, yet distinct, problem: their adaptability
to new circumstances and new technologies. As technology has developed, it
has spawned new forms of creativity. At the same time, it has resulted in the
proliferation of new technologies for using and copying existing works, and,
in turn, facilitated new kinds of behavior among both creators and users.
The text of the copyright statute—crystallized as it was in 1976—has had to
keep up with these realities, and give effect to the system’s core objectives,
especially as they emanate from copyright’s constitutionally enshrined
utilitarian goals. It is in this latter respect that federal courts have resorted
to the equity of the copyright statute to ensure that behavior and new
technologies come to be governed by the spirit and purposes of the
copyright system, even if not expressly by the terms of the copyright
statute. Through a complex interplay between the text of the copyright
statute and these purposes, courts have successfully updated copyright doctrine.
In this process courts rarely, if ever, expressly mention the doctrine of
the equity of the statute. All the same, there can be no doubt that in many
cases, courts do more than merely apply the statute. Rather, they engage in
lawmaking. Somewhat interestingly, this tracks the very evolution in the use
of the doctrine of equity of the statute over the last century. By the late
nineteenth century, courts across the country began to reject parties’ express
reliance on the doctrine, especially in situations where it was seen as a

51
52

Id. at 20-21.
For instance, copyright’s requirement of “substantial similarity” is not mentioned in the
statute. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.01. For a fuller account, see Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203 (2012).
53 For example copyright’s “originality” requirement, which is mentioned once in the statute.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). For a normative reconstruction based on this ambiguity, see Gideon
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505 (2009).

1870

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1859

method of annulling the directives of a statute.54 Central to this rejection
was the recognition that the doctrine enabled courts to overtly exercise “the
power of legislation,”55 which was seen as repugnant to contemporary “views
as to the function of the judiciary.”56 Thus emerged the modified position
that the best way of interpreting a statute was instead to look to the
legislature’s “intent,” when the text produced anomalous results. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Holy Trinity is a prime example of this move.
There, the Court constructed the “spirit” of the legislation, but concluded
that this spirit was embodied in the “intention” of the legislators, and
therefore was a legitimate way to construe the statute in question.57 The
intentionalist approach thus came to replace the ready recourse to the
equity of the statute and soon dominated the landscape.58
A central aim of Legal Realism was to have courts lay bare their
normative influences when deciding cases, rather than hide behind doctrinal
categories and formal rules. To the Realists, hiding behind the cloak of
legislative intent was therefore an anathema.59 In addition, they sought to
expose the reality that courts were actively engaging in lawmaking, rather
than merely declaring the law, which they in turn viewed as largely
unproblematic. Their solution was thus to resurrect courts’ reliance on the
equity of the statute as a method of interpretation and lawmaking. The
intentionalist approach was seen as a form of “dissembling.”60 Their revived
vision for the equity of the statute doctrine was not just one that annulled
the terms of the statute when unfavorable but rather one where judges
regularly supplemented and augmented the legislation with policy
considerations. It was thus “purposive” and actively embraced judicial
lawmaking.61 This was in contrast to the intentionalist approach that saw
judicial lawmaking as illegitimate, and to the old invocation of the equity of
the statute that was largely agnostic on this issue. To realize this revival, the
Legal Realists did not need courts to use the idea of a statute’s equity
explicitly, given their supplementing (rather than annulling) role. Thus, by
the mid–twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s realist justices came to
54 See, e.g., Tompkins v. First Nat’l Bank, 18 N.Y.S. 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892); Encking v.
Simmons, 28 Wis. 272 (1871).
55 Loyd, supra note 23, at 84.
56 Id.
57 Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar rule that
a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”).
58 Manning, supra note 4, at 15.
59 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
60 Landis, supra note 32, at 219.
61 Manning, supra note 4, at 24.
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describe the doctrine as an “artificial canon”62 and as entailing a “loose
conception,”63 even though their actual decisions in these cases themselves
focused on the statute’s goals and purposes to construct and supplement its
text. The equity of the statute was now playing a principally unstated role.
In his well-known piece on the canons of statutory interpretation, Karl
Llewellyn thus concluded that:
If a statute is to be merged into a going system of law, moreover, the court
must do the merging, and must in so doing take account of the policy of the
statute—or else substitute its own version of such policy. Creative reshaping
of the net result is thus inevitable.64

“Creative reshaping” in light of the actual or constructed purpose and policy
of a statute was thus seen as an inevitable consequence of doctrinal
indeterminacy, the principal hallmark of the Realist critique. Llewellyn
readily points out that in numerous situations, talk of legislative “intent” is
meaningless; especially in situations where the statutory language “is called
upon to deal with circumstances utterly uncontemplated at the time of its
passage.”65 A “broad purpose” is thus to be “quarried” out of the statute in
its application.66 There is little doubt that Llewellyn describes in near-exact
terms the modern version of the equity of the statute doctrine, in its
unstated form.
And it is precisely such a “creative reshaping” that we see at play in the
Supreme Court’s copyright jurisprudence under the 1976 Act. While never
once invoking the equity of the statute, the Court recognizes itself to be
making new law, filling gaps in the doctrine, and performing a role
analogous to that of traditional equity: ensuring that the bluntness of a
general rule does not result in circumvention of its core purpose or spirit.
We see this occurring in relation to both the substantive and adjectival (i.e.,
procedural and remedial) content of the Act. In what follows, we show that
several of the Supreme Court’s most prominent copyright decisions can be
62 United States v. Ogilvie Hardware Co., 330 U.S. 709, 721 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“I am no friend of artificial canons of construction, and I would not strain language in
order to construe tax exemptions strictly. On the other hand, Revenue Acts are not the kind of
legislation which should be loosely construed in order to grant exemptions.”).
63 Lewyt Corp. v. Comm’r, 349 U.S. 237, 249 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Where the
taxing measure is clear, of course, there is no place for loose conceptions about the ‘equity of the
statute.’ Revenue laws are notoriously not expressions of an ordered system of reason and
fairness.”).
64 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).
65 Id.
66 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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understood as efforts to give effect to the substantive and adjectival equity
of the copyright statute.67
A. Copyright’s Substantive Equity
Most of copyright’s substantive content—rights, liabilities, powers, and
immunities—is specified in the Copyright Act of 1976. Despite this reality,
courts attempting to understand and apply the statutory directives to
specific situations soon realize that many of the questions posed by the
modern day application of the statute were simply not foreseeable to
Congress at the time that the statute was enacted. Consequently, courts
cannot simply apply the law in those situations. The Supreme Court’s
preferred approach in such circumstances exhibits a remarkable resemblance
to the equity of the statute doctrine.
In its copyright jurisprudence, the Court usually begins with a
recognition that copyright law is principally statutory in origin, and that its
own task is therefore one of applying the relevant statutory directive as the
preexisting doctrine. Yet, a close reading of the statute reveals hardly any
guidance as to how this task should be performed. The recognition that the
law is indeterminate, in turn, allows the Court to discern an underlying
purpose behind copyright’s statutory scheme. This purpose usually
manifests itself in varying levels of generality and abstraction: it may be
traced back to copyright’s utilitarian ideal as enshrined in the Constitution,
translated into incentive terms, represented in the statute’s contextual
approach to realizing its utilitarian goal, or characterized in the statute’s
unique structural history. Once the purpose is discerned, the specific
statutory directive in question is construed in light of this identified
purpose, with alternative readings of the ambiguous term then treated as
incompatible with the scheme of the statute.
Recall that the equity of the statute doctrine—in its Realist
formulation—involved courts discerning a “spirit” or “purpose” behind the
statute, and then using that to make law without explicitly overriding the
terms of the statute. In area after area of substantive copyright
jurisprudence, we find the Court relying on copyright’s core goals to glean
67 We do not claim that our theory applies to all of the Supreme Court’s copyright decisions,
some of which were motivated by altogether independent considerations. A few, for instance, were
driven by the Court’s reliance on constitutional principles. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873
(2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (analyzing the constitutional validity of the
Copyright Term Extension Act); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998)
(interpreting the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial as applicable to copyright trials
involving statutory damages).
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meaning from otherwise plain statutory language. The discussion below
illustrates this pattern using areas from the Court’s substantive copyright
jurisprudence.
1. Fair Use: Harper & Row
The fair use doctrine, copyright’s principal safety valve, allows courts to
treat specific acts of copying as non-infringing under certain circumstances.
Originally a creation of the federal courts,68 the fair use doctrine was
codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.69 As codified, section
107 delineates four non-exhaustive statutory factors that courts are to
consider during a fair use determination.70
In Harper & Row, the plaintiff was a publisher that had entered into a
contract to publish President Ford’s memoir as a book.71 Prior to the
publication of the book, the defendant, the Nation Magazine, obtained a
purloined copy of the manuscript from an undisclosed source, and
proceeded to run a news story, excerpting from the book and revealing its
central part. In the news industry, this was a practice known as “scooping.”72
Unhappy with these actions, the plaintiff commenced an action for
copyright infringement against the defendants, who in turn claimed that
their actions constituted fair use—especially since they were engaged in
news reporting.73
The Court began its opinion with a discussion of copyright’s overall
purpose, which it identified as being to “motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the
public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control has expired.”74 This purpose, the Court noted, was
manifest in the “scheme established by the Copyright Act.”75 These
68
69
70

Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
These factors include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Id.
71
72
73
74
75

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542-44 (1985).
Id. at 556.
Id. at 543-44.
Id. at 546 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
Id. at 545.
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observations were more than mere rhetoric, for the Court then proceeded to
recognize that among the copyright owner’s important rights that derive
from this logic was the right of first publication, which it reasoned was
essential to motivating creativity.76 The right of first publication finds no
explicit mention in the list of exclusive rights mentioned in the Act, and yet
the Court relied in large part on the overall scheme of the Act, copyright’s
ideal of motivating creativity, and the legislative history—which indicated
that Congress intended to equate publication with distribution—in order to
read this right into the copyright entitlement.77
Upon reading this right into the Act, the Court proceeded to carry out
its analysis of fair use. Building on its prior logic, the Court treated the
right of first publication as “shift[ing]” the “balance of equities” in favor of
the plaintiff.78 In the Court’s view, the unpublished nature of the work
operated to “negate a defense of fair use.”79 Moving to a direct application
of the four factors, the Court then used this idea to weigh some of the
obvious fair use factors, which might have otherwise favored fair use,
against the defendant. It relied on the unpublished nature of the work,
together with the fact that the defendant used the work knowing that the
copy it possessed had been stolen to scoop its content, as a basis for
characterizing the defendant’s behavior as lacking “good faith.”80 The
unpublished nature of the work also allowed the Court to overcome the
reality that the work itself was largely factual/historical, rather than original,
in content.81 Finding that the copying was substantial and had produced an
adverse market effect on the plaintiff ’s work, the Court denied the
defendant’s fair use claim, despite the fact that (1) “news reporting” is
enumerated in the statute as a form of fair use,82 (2) the statute does not
enumerate good faith as a relevant factor in fair use determinations,83 and
(3) the right of first publication was likewise not mentioned in the statute.

76
77

Id. at 549.
Id. at 551-52; see also 2 NIMMER, supra note 42, § 8.11[C][1][b] (“The opinion went out of
its way to confer special solicitude on the right of first publication in safeguarding it against a
capacious fair use construction . . . .”).
78 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553.
79 Id. at 554.
80 Id. at 562-63.
81 Id. at 563-64.
82 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
83 Id. Indeed, not only is there not a single mention of good faith, but the statute also
explicitly provides that fair use can be found even for unpublished works. “The fact that a work is
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of
all the above factors.” Id.
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While the Court in Harper & Row certainly made every effort to appear
to be working within the directives of the Act, its reasoning unquestionably
transcended the terms of the statute, and the Court drew extensively from
its own reconstruction of Congress’s goals behind the copyright system,
which it projected into specific elements of copyright doctrine.
2. Originality: Feist
Copyright protects “original works of authorship.”84 Beyond this
fleeting mention of the term, the statute nowhere defines nor
operationalizes the idea of originality—despite the reality that historically
courts have treated it as a critical prerequisite for copyright protection. In
1991, the Supreme Court was called upon to give content to the idea for the
first time under the Act of 1976.85
Feist involved a plaintiff that produced an alphabetically arranged
telephone directory consisting of the names, addresses, and telephone
numbers of individuals and businesses in a region.86 The defendant, another
manufacturer of telephone directories, copied significant portions of the
plaintiff ’s directory into its own directory.87 The question before the Court
was whether the plaintiff ’s telephone directory was sufficiently original to
receive copyright protection as a compilation.88 The Court answered the
question in the negative, and in so doing, transformed the doctrine of
originality.
In trying to give meaning to “originality,” the Court began by
attempting to tie the term to copyright’s overall purpose. Since the
Constitution authorizes Congress to protect only the “writings” of
“[a]uthors,” the Court treated this as requiring some “intellectual labor,”
deriving from the “creative powers of the mind.”89 Originality was thus seen
as requiring a “creative component.”90 The Court therefore concluded that
originality was constitutionally mandated, and that it required a “modicum
of creativity” on the part of the author.91
To get to this position, however, the Court had to overcome a line of
cases that had developed a theory of copyright known as the “sweat of the
brow” doctrine, which equated originality with any labor on the part of the
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
Feist, Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
Id. at 342.
Id. at 342-44.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 346-47.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 362.
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creator, whether creative or not.92 In enacting the Act of 1976, Congress did
not expressly overrule this doctrine.93 Nor was the legislative history
explicit about a legislative intent to so overrule.94 It was therefore left to the
Court to craft an argument that delegitimized the “sweat of the brow”
doctrine. The Court stated that the doctrine “flouted basic copyright
principles.”95 Comparing the terms of the 1976 Act to its predecessor, the
1909 Act, and the former’s use of the term “originality” in its definition of a
“compilation,” the Court concluded that the statutory structure
unquestionably recognizes that copyright (in a compilation) cannot arise
from mere labor, since every compilation entails some labor, but the Act
limits protection to original compilations.96 This meant that some
compilations may indeed not qualify for protection without some “creative”
selection or arrangement.97 Building on this logic, the Court eventually
concluded that there was “no doubt” that originality replaced “sweat of the
brow” given the Act’s guiding purposes—in turn enabling it to equate
originality with creativity, and “sweat of the brow” with mere labor.98
Feist provides a powerful example of the Court’s tacit invocation of the
equity of the copyright statute to inform its substantive content. Rooting
originality in the overall constitutionally dictated purposes of the Act, even
in the absence of express guidance within the statute, allowed the Court to
reconstruct copyright doctrine in the image of its own vision for what
copyright law was striving to do in protecting works of expression:
encouraging creative labor.
3. Secondary Liability: Sony and Grokster
In addition to imposing potential liability on actors who infringe any of
the exclusive rights granted to owners under the Act, copyright law also
imposes such liability on actors who “contribute” to the infringement, while
not infringing the work themselves. Known as indirect infringement, or
secondary liability, this form of liability finds but a passing mention in the
1976 Act, which grants copyright owners exclusive rights “to do and to
authorize” certain actions.99 In two cases, the Court had to grapple with the
scope of secondary liability.
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 355-56.
Id.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 356-58.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 359-60.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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In Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios, the Court was called upon to
examine the liability of a VCR manufacturer under the theory of
contributory infringement.100 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant’s
device was being actively used by consumers for infringing purposes,
rendering its act of introducing the device into the stream of commerce an
act of contributory infringement.101 In its well-known opinion, the Court
found for the defendant. Readily recognizing that the statute was quiet on
the scope and extent of such liability, the Court located the doctrine’s
purpose in “the recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly may
require courts to look beyond actual duplication . . . to the products or
activities that make such duplication possible.”102 At the same time, the
Court recognized that this necessitated a balance between enhanced
protection and the “rights of others freely to engage in . . . commerce.”103
Drawing on the doctrine of contributory infringement as developed in
patent law, the Court developed its own version of the balance: liability for
contributory infringement could be avoided if the device or product was
“capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”104 Applying the test to the VCR,
the Court concluded that users could engage either in time-shifting that was
authorized by copyright owners or in unauthorized time-shifting that could
qualify as fair use, which rendered the VCR capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.105
Sony’s principal contribution thus lies in its development of the
“substantial noninfringing use” defense to contributory infringement.
While it was developed in common law fashion owing to the absence of any
express statutory directive, the Court nonetheless sought to ensure that its
formulation was compatible with the overall goals and purposes of the
Copyright Act. In finding for the defendants, the Court’s opinion also
seems to reject the idea that it was making new law when it concluded that
“it is not our [i.e., the Court’s] job to apply laws that have not yet been
written.”106 Rather, the Court viewed its opinion as merely “[a]pplying the
copyright statute, as it now reads . . . .”107 Unquestionably then, the Court in
Sony determined the equity of the statute and translated it into an

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 442-56.
Id. at 456.
Id.
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altogether new defense, which it viewed as entailed by the spirit of the
copyright statute.
Two decades later, the Court was called upon to revisit its holding in
Sony in another case involving secondary liability, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. Here, the technology in question was a peer-topeer file sharing service that allowed individual users to share unauthorized
copies of music and video with each other over the Internet.108 The
distributors of the technology, unlike the defendants in Sony, were shown to
have known about such infringing uses, done nothing about it, and indeed,
according to the Court, encouraged infringements by end-users.109 The
Court was asked to examine whether the “substantial noninfringing use”
defense it had developed in Sony might apply here.
Once again, the Court began its decision with a reference to the need for
“a sound balance” between encouraging creativity, on the one hand, and
promoting innovation in new communication technologies—copyright’s
core utilitarian goal—on the other.110 Instead of reconsidering its decision in
Sony, however, the Court chose to skirt the issue by concluding that the Sony
defense had no application to the case.111 Having summarily disposed of
Sony, the Grokster Court then chose to develop an altogether new theory of
secondary liability, once again by reference to patent law: liability for
inducement, which attaches to “one who distributes a device with the object
of promoting its use to infringe copyright.”112 It then used this new standard
to find against the defendants in the case and impose liability.113 Much like
the Sony Court, the Grokster Court was also motivated by the need to
balance the conflicting demands of incentives and access. Yet, unlike in Sony,
it saw the balance tilting in favor of the plaintiffs.
Unlike in Sony, the Court in Grokster made no effort to argue that its
reasoning was no more than an application of the statute itself. This was
perhaps in express recognition that two decades after Sony, it was rather
obvious to all that the Court was not just applying the statute to a new case,
but was indeed making altogether new law.

108
109
110
111
112
113

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-27 (2005).
Id. at 925-26.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 936.
Id. at 941.
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4. First Sale: Kirtsaeng
The exclusive right to distribute copies of the work to the public is
among the exclusive rights that the Copyright Act grants authors.114 The
“first sale” doctrine emerged as one of the earliest exceptions to this right.
The doctrine deals with the bifurcation of the ownership of the physical
medium embodying the copyrighted content and of the copyright in the
underlying work.115 In other words, the first sale doctrine permits purchasers
of products containing a copyrighted work (e.g., a book containing a literary
work) to transfer the physical product to others, without thereby violating
the copyright owner’s distribution right.
The 1976 Act codified the first sale defense for the first time, but limited
its application to owners of particular copies that were “lawfully made”
under the Act.116 Additionally, the Act also treated the unauthorized
importation of copies acquired outside the country into the United States as
a violation of the distribution right.117 While it was accepted that the first
sale doctrine applied to such importations, the question arose whether the
phrase “lawfully made” required the product or copy in question to have
been manufactured domestically.118
In Quality King Distributors v. L’Anza Research,119 the Supreme Court was
asked to determine the relationship between the first sale doctrine and the
ban on unauthorized importation of copies of protected works, as it appears
in § 602(a). L’Anza, a manufacturer of hair care products, brought suit
against Quality King Distributors for purchasing L’Anza’s products abroad
and subsequently importing and selling them in the United States.120
L’Anza claimed that this practice violated the anti-importation ban in
§ 602(a) since L’Anza’s hair care products bore copyrighted labels.121 Quality
King argued that the suit should be dismissed since its actions came within
the scope of the first sale doctrine, which allowed owners of lawfully made
copies of copyrighted works to deal with them as they see fit, inter alia, by
reselling them.122 In response L’Anza asserted that the first sale privilege
114
115

17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (“The purchaser of a book, once sold
by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new
edition of it.”).
116 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
117 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1).
118 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 145-46 (1998).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 139-40.
121 Id. at 140.
122 Id.
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applied only to copies purchased in United States, while those purchased
abroad were subject to the anti-importation ban in § 602(a).123 In other
words, the key disagreement between the parties concerned the geographic
reach of the first sale doctrine. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens
concluded that the right granted to the plaintiff by § 602(a) was
unquestionably subject to § 109(a).124 The Court proceeded to explain that
“[a]fter the first sale of a copyrighted item ‘lawfully made under this title,’
any subsequent purchaser, whether from a domestic or from a foreign
reseller, is obviously an ‘owner’ of that item” and could resell it under the
first sale doctrine.125
The opinion of the Court seemed to have closed the door on any
attempt by copyright owners to expand the scope of their protection by
attempting to ban importation of lawful copies of copyrighted work. But
not quite. The Court was invited to revisit the issue in Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons.126
In Kirtsaeng, the defendant had legally purchased authorized, low-priced
editions of books that were published and printed outside the United States
and resold them in the United States for significantly higher prices, making
a large profit in the process.127 The publisher-plaintiff argued that these
actions were not covered by the first sale doctrine because the books were
not “lawfully made” within the United States.128 The defendant, on the
other hand, argued that the phrase did not impose a geographic requirement
but simply suggested that the defense would apply as long as the
manufacturing of the books was “in compliance with” the general terms of
the statute.129
The Court’s reasoning in Kirtsaeng, unlike in other copyright cases, was
less about trying to make affirmative sense out of the statute’s directives and
creating a new rule and more about seeking to limit the application and
reach of the statute’s blunt-edged directive. The plaintiff ’s reading of the
term would have expanded the reach of the statute quite significantly,
thereby rendering large swaths of established practices in the market for
second-hand goods unlawful. In preferring the defendant’s reading of the
phrase, the Court was influenced in large measure by the “consequences” of
the plaintiff ’s expansive reading, which it saw as likely to produce a parade
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 145-46.
Id.
Id. at 145.
133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
Id. at 1356-57.
Id. at 1357-58.
Id. at 1358.
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of “horribles” when translated into practice.130 Despite offering a linguistic
rationale for its holding,131 the Court drew on the common law basis of the
first sale doctrine and its importance in commerce—which it argued was
presumptively important even under the terms of the 1976 Act—to
eventually conclude that the plaintiff ’s interpretation was neither required
by the statute, nor indeed preferable given the underlying scheme and
purposes of the doctrine as codified.132
Kirtsaeng, unlike the Court’s other decisions in the area, can thus be seen
as an effort to apply the equity of the statute to annul a partially ambiguous
provision, all in the interests of rendering the copyright system compatible
with a variety of common sense–driven commercial goals underlying the
first sale doctrine. The “lawfully made” requirement was, as a result,
rendered largely redundant after the decision.
5. Public Performance: Aereo
Another right that the 1976 Act grants authors is the exclusive right “to
perform the copyrighted work publicly.”133 In an effort to cover cable
television, which was fresh in Congress’s mind at the time of drafting, the
Act further defines a “public performance” as either a performance in a
public place or a transmission by a device or process regardless of whether
members of the public “receive it in the same place or in separate places and
at the same time or at different times.”134
Aereo involved a service that picked up free over-the-air broadcast
signals using antennae and then retransmitted the underlying content over
the Internet for a fee to its subscribers. In order to differentiate itself from
regular CATV services—which Congress had chosen to regulate under the
terms of the Copyright Act—Aereo used thousands of dime-sized antennas,
each of which was assigned to an individual subscriber when the subscriber
chose to receive a stream of a near-live show.135 Additionally, to avoid
seeming as though it were merely retransmitting the content, Aereo’s
technology made a local copy of the content on its servers and streamed that
local copy seconds after the recording began.136 The key question was

130
131
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133
134
135
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Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1358-60.
Id. at 1371.
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012).
Id. § 101.
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014).
Id.
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whether Aereo’s service violated the plaintiffs’ public performance right in
their works.137
The Court found that it did.138 Its logic was that Aereo’s service was far
too similar to cable television, despite its differing technology.139 While the
Court began with the statute’s definition of a public performance, its
opinion soon placed all of its emphasis on Congress’s presumptive purpose
in creating the public performance right—the regulation of cable television
and analogous technologies.140 Looking to the state of the industry at the
time of the 1976 Act, the Court characterized the Act’s public performance
right as motivated by “Congress’ regulatory objectives”141 contained in its
singular desire to “bring the activities of cable systems within the scope” of
the statute.142 In light of this, to the Court, “Congress would as much have
intended to protect a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of
Aereo as from those of cable companies.”143
In Aereo, therefore, the Court directly discerned the equity of the
copyright statute in order to expand its reach to a new technology.144 While
couched in terms of a presumptive legislative intent, the Court’s reasoning
comes down to its reconstruction of the Act’s “regulatory” logic,145 the idea
that the statute’s balance—as embodied in the public performance right—
extends to all technologies of retransmission that follow the same structure
of cable television by building a commercial model of delivery around freely
available television broadcasts. In no uncertain terms, the Court’s opinion
expanded the substantive content of the Act into new and potentially
unforeseeable areas, a reality that the dissent in the case all too readily
criticized.146
B. Copyright’s Adjectival Equity
When it comes to the remedial and procedural dimensions of the Act,
the Court’s approach is analytically different from its approach to the
substantive dimension. In dealing with the Act’s adjectival dimensions, the
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For an account of Aereo along these lines, but which draws a different conclusion than the
Court, see Andrew Tutt, Textualism and the Equity of the Copyright Act: Reflections Inspired by
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE (2014).
145 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508.
146 Id. at 2518 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Court is less concerned with determining the actual content of the law by
reference to its own conception of copyright’s goals. Instead, its focus is on
ensuring that the law remains sufficiently flexible, so as to allow future
courts to apply it situationally in ways that further the copyright system’s
goals and purposes.
The Court’s approach to the Act’s adjectival component can be
understood as driven by the need to preserve a central role for judicial
discretion. The Court tailors the system’s procedures and remedies on an
individual basis, so as to align them contextually with copyright’s goals.
Copyright’s goals and purposes therefore remain motivational but enter the
equation only as a justification for flexibility, rather than as a substantive
influence to resolve doctrinal indeterminacy. In its jurisprudence, the Court
consciously rejects readings of the Copyright Act that serve to limit the
judicial function in policing and molding the remedies or processes that are
applied to copyright cases. Seen as driven by an effort to preserve judicial
discretion, the Court’s adjectival jurisprudence in copyright law represents
an effort to use the equity of the statute to create a zone of equitable
discretion within the functioning of the copyright system.
1. Attorneys’ Fees: Fogerty
Among the several remedies available to parties under the Copyright
Act is a provision that allows courts in civil actions to “award a reasonable
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party . . . .”147 The question that soon
emerged in a series of lower courts cases was whether this provision allowed
a prevailing defendant to seek attorneys’ fees as well, or whether it was
restricted in its scope to prevailing plaintiffs.
The plaintiff in Fogerty argued that the Act incorporated a “dual
approach” in § 505, which restricted attorneys’ fees to prevailing
plaintiffs.148 Among the reasons offered by the plaintiff was the argument
that “equitable considerations” embodied in the goals of the Act required
adherence to the dual approach.149 The Court adamantly rejected this
argument and held that the provision applies to prevailing defendants as
well.150 It concluded that the dual approach adopts a “one-sided view of the
purposes” underlying the Act.151 Tracing copyright’s goals back to the
Constitution, the Court emphasized the “limited” nature of the copyright
147
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monopoly,152 which in its view required encouraging defendants to litigate
claims when they believe they might have “meritorious copyright
defenses.”153 Such a “successful defense,” the Court argued, “may further the
policies of the Copyright Act” as well.154
While the Court rejected the dual approach, it also simultaneously
refused to formulate a rule that would mandate an award of attorneys’ fees
to any prevailing party.155 Instead, the Court chose to emphasize the
importance of discretion: both parties were entitled to invoke the provision,
but ultimately the decision whether to award attorneys’ fees was left to the
“court’s discretion” as exercised in light of the individual circumstances of
each case.156
In adopting this intermediate approach, the Court’s principal concern
appears to have been enabling future courts to tailor their awards to the
unique circumstances of each case, regardless of whether it involves a
successful plaintiff or a successful defendant. “Equitable discretion” was
thus the touchstone of the provision for the Court, which it saw as essential
for the realization of copyright’s goals and purposes. The system’s objectives
were therefore a justification for the Court’s entrenchment of an equitable
space in this area for future courts.
2. Registration: Reed Elsevier
Since 1988, the registration of a work is no longer a prerequisite for
protection under the Act. However, § 411(a) of the Act requires a work to be
registered with the Copyright Office before a “civil action for infringement”
can be commenced in a federal court.157 In a vast majority of cases, this
involves a plaintiff registering the work immediately prior to the
commencement of an infringement action, and the provision serves no
immediate purpose. The question that recently emerged, however, was
whether this requirement barred a federal court from entertaining a lawsuit
that involved both registered and unregistered works.
In Reed Elsevier, the Court had to decide whether the registration
requirement could be understood as a jurisdictional restriction, which would
deny a federal court subject matter jurisdiction, or as a mere “claim-
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processing rule[],” which would not.158 A jurisdictional requirement operates
as a limit on a court’s power to adjudicate a case by depriving the court of
subject matter jurisdiction, thereby effectively limiting the statute’s reach
and scope in certain domains.159 A claim-processing rule, on the other hand,
gives a party raising the rule as a defense the possibility of procedural
relief.160 All the same, when that party fails to raise the rule, it does not
limit the ability of the court to reach the merits of the issue. In this
conception, failure to register a work might be raised by a defendant for a
dismissal of the case, but when not raised it places no bar on a court that
chooses to hear the case. Treating § 411(a) as a jurisdictional rule would have
significantly curtailed the ability of federal courts to reach the merits of a
case when the defendant forfeits the defense. Examining the structure and
purpose of the requirement the Court rather unequivocally concluded that
the provision was a mere claim-processing requirement, with no
jurisdictional effect.161 Courts were thus within their powers to hear
infringement claims even when the work was unregistered.
The defendant in the case also sought to argue that treating the
registration requirement as a jurisdictional element would serve the
underlying goals of the Act by encouraging registration of works.162
Somewhat interestingly, the Court summarily dismissed this argument
without examining whether there was any merit to this contention.163 To the
Court, preserving courts’ jurisdiction to hear these cases appears to have
been paramount, in order to preserve the integrity of the Act’s
“comprehensive statutory scheme” and to avoid having the “remedial
scheme” of the Act interfere with its substantive rights.164 Disempowering
courts of their ability to hear copyright cases, merely because of
noncompliance with the statute’s formalities, was unquestionably problematic
to the Court.
3. Laches: Petrella
The Court’s most recent adjectival foray into the Copyright Act
involved the equitable doctrine of laches. Laches, as understood in equity,
involves a delay on the part of the plaintiff in commencing a lawsuit that
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prejudices or disadvantages the defendant and allows the court to deny the
claim altogether.165 It is traditionally invoked in situations where a statute
contains no limitations period. The Copyright Act, however, does contain
an express statute of limitations, requiring all civil actions to commence
“within three years after the claim accrue[s].”166 The question that arose was
thus whether the doctrine of laches could be invoked to bar claims even
within this period of limitations.
Again, the Court approached the question in terms of attempts to limit
courts’ discretionary powers. The Ninth Circuit had treated the doctrine of
laches as a bright-line rule and concluded that the doctrine could be
“presume[d]” to bar the claim in its entirety if any part of the wrongful
conduct occurred outside the three year window.167 In effect, the position of
the Ninth Circuit, which the defendants supported before the Court, was
that as long as some part of the defendants’ conduct occurred before the
three year window, laches could be presumed without any showing of
prejudice. This effectively barred the claim altogether, even if the plaintiff
was only seeking a forward-looking remedy, such as an injunction, or one
restricted to the previous three years. The Court saw this as an attempt to
limit its discretion in individual cases, and rejected altogether the
applicability of the laches doctrine to “bar” the suit within the statute of
limitations.168 All the same, the Court recognized the need for such
equitable flexibility, but concluded that it existed at the remedial level, in
tailoring the kind of relief sought by the plaintiff, or through the doctrine of
equitable estoppel.169
A primary justification for its conclusion was the idea that copyright
owners should not feel compelled to bring economically unjustifiable
lawsuits against infringers, merely in order to preserve their rights—
something that the laches rule (as an absolute bar) would accomplish.170 The
“presumptive bar” approach to laches in effect amounted to an approach
that curbed, rather than extended, courts’ equitable discretion, and their
ability to police when, why, or how copyright plaintiffs might choose to
commence actions for infringement. The Court saw this limiting effect as
antithetical to the realization of copyright’s goals on an individual basis,
causing it to take the laches defense off the table altogether. Once again
165 JOHN NORTON POMEROY JR., A TREATISE ON E QUITABLE REMEDIES § 21 (1905).
166 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012).
167 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d 134 S. Ct.
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preserving courts’ flexibility and discretion for the future seems to have
been the Court’s principal motivation, which it saw as crucial to the
realization of copyright’s goals.
CONCLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND REALISM
IN COPYRIGHT LAW
A review of the Supreme Court’s copyright jurisprudence reveals much
about copyright lawmaking in the United States, the role of courts therein,
and the influences on their thinking. To begin with, it confirms the idea that
in deciding copyright cases, the Court is quite self-consciously engaged in
the process of making copyright law, not just applying it. In the four
decades since the enactment of the Copyright Act, the Court’s own
jurisprudence reveals a gradual and open acceptance of its lawmaking role,
as other participants in the system have come to grow comfortable with the
idea that courts do indeed make law in this area. In its most recent cases,
however, the Court’s opinions leave no doubt that it has embraced this
reality, an enduring influence of early Legal Realism.
Our Article shows that given the statutory origins of copyright law, the
Court’s approach to copyright lawmaking involves discerning the unstated
equity underlying the statute, and giving effect to it through its doctrinal
(re)formulations. The Court’s modus operandi in this regard begins with an
identification of the indeterminacy of a statutory copyright directive, the
formal doctrine so to speak. In theory, its lawmaking is confined to the
interstices of the statute; rarely ever is the Court willing to overtly annul
the terms of the statute. Its approach is thus to explicate the goals and
purposes of the Copyright Act and creatively reshape doctrine in light of
these purposes. The reshaping is always done by reference to a finite set of
ideals, drawn to a large extent from the Constitution’s utilitarian mandate
for the institution. Whenever possible, the Court’s lawmaking exercise
attempts to develop a level of coherence and rationality within the working
of the copyright system, drawn from these widely accepted purposes. In this
sense, the Court’s jurisprudence exhibits a strong urge for systemic
“rationality,” a trend seen among the later Legal Realists.171 As scholars have
pointed out, this rationalist impulse was in tension with the core idea of
indeterminacy that motivated the early Realists, and yet it came to be seen
as critical to the constructive (as opposed to critical) project of Legal

171 For an excellent overview of this development, see Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The
Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 611 (1993).
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Realism.172 This rationalist tendency in the Court’s copyright jurisprudence
is very much a Realist phenomenon and evinces a distinctively pragmatic
bent. The Court’s identification of doctrinal indeterminacy in the statute is
therefore strongly complemented by its rationalist tendency, which of
course takes different shapes depending on the particular question involved.
All the same, however, merely because the Court’s jurisprudence in the
area builds on the indeterminacy of extant copyright doctrine to justify its
own lawmaking, one should not conclude that copyright doctrine—as
contained in the statute—imposes no constraint whatsoever on the Court.
Quite the contrary. The directives of the statute continue to influence the
ways in which courts approach their lawmaking in the copyright context,
which is why they implicitly resort to the process of determining the “equity
of the statute.”
In implicitly resorting to the “equity” of the copyright statute, rather
than resorting to open-ended considerations of utility or social welfare, to
resolve indeterminate doctrinal puzzles, the Court’s copyright jurisprudence
might also be seen as consciously mediating extra-legal normative
considerations through doctrinal ideas. The copyright statute’s equity is thus
rendered a core part of copyright doctrine, constraining legal reasoning in
the area.
In summary then, the Court’s copyright jurisprudence since the passage
of the Copyright Act of 1976 represents an extensive modern day
application of the equity of the statute doctrine, as an unstated mechanism
of lawmaking. In it, we see many of the lessons of Legal Realism
internalized, in the process creating a robust equilibrium between the
formal content of the statute and judge-made law. Rather than hide behind
the indeterminacy of doctrine—be it statutory or otherwise—the Court
appears to have actively embraced its role as a lawmaker in this area.
Copyright law is regarded as “having purposes, not values in itself; and that
the clearer visualization of the problems involved moves toward everdecreasing emphasis on words, and ever-increasing emphasis on observable
behavior.”173 Llewellyn would have been satisfied.

172 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to
The Legal Process (discussing this tension), in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li,
lxv (1994).
173 Llewellyn, supra note 31, at 464.

